In In her her recent recent article article "Death, "Death, Mis Mis fortune, fortune, and and Species Species Inequality,"l Inequality,"l Ruth Ruth Cigman Cigman gives gives clear, clear, careful careful expression expression to to an an argument argument which which seems seems well well on on its its way way to to becomi becomi ng ng a a classic classic among among opponents opponents of of animal animal rights. rights.
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Cigman's Cigman's argument argument runs runs as as follows: follows:
A A right right to to X X entails entails the the right right to to be be protected protected against against certain certain actions actions which which will will result result in in the the misfortune, misfortune, or or possible possible misfortu misfortu ne, ne, of of not-X. not-X. A A condition condition for for being being the the sub sub ject ject of of a a right right is is therefore therefore the the capacity capacity to to be be the the subject subject of of the the corresponding corresponding misfortune. misfortune. (49) (49) For For a a creature creature to to be be a a possible possible subject subject of of the the misfor misfor tune tune of of death, death, life life itself itself must must be be an an object object of of value value for for it, it, and and this this possibility possibility is is presup presup posedby posedby the the right right to to life; life; otherwise otherwise the the right right to to life life would would be be a a right right to to be be pro pro tected tected from from something something which which could could not not conceivably conceivably be be a a mis mis fortune, fortune, which which does does not not make make sense. sense. (59) (59)
The The relationship· relationship· between between capacity capacity and and desire desire in in this this context context must must be be examined. examined. My My suggestion suggestion is is that, that, when when we we fill fill in in the the concept concept of of desiring desiring not not to to die die in in a a way way which which is is relevant relevant to to the the misfortune misfortune of of death death and and the the right right to to life, life, we we shall shall have have to to withhold withhold this this from from animals. animals. (49-50) (49-50) For For convenient convenient reference reference we we may may reduce reduce this this argument argument to to the the following following compact compact form: form:
Pl C: C: Therefore, Therefore, animals animals cannot cannot have have a a right right to to life. life. Each Each of of the the premises premises of of this this argument argument is is dubious. dubious.
Even Even P2, P2, which which seems seems the the safest safest of of the the lot, lot, would would be be chal chal lenged lenged by by some some rights rights theorists, theorists, such such as as H. H. L. L. A. A. Hart, Hart, who who hold hold that that rights rights are are not not essentially essentially devices devices for for protecting protecting interests interests but but for for securing securing choices. choices. However, However, we we will will not not pur pur sue sue this this line line of of criticism criticism here. here. Whether Whether a a careful careful analysis analysis of of rights rights would would reveal reveal that that the the right right to to life life protects protects our our interest interest in in life, life, secures secures our our choice choice to to remain remain alive, alive, or or some some thing thing else, else, this this right right seems seems clearly clearly tied tied to to death death being being a a misfortune. misfortune. P3 P3 would would certainly certainly be be attacked attacked by by many many advocates advocates of of animal animal rights rights who who emphasize emphasize tIthe tIthe evolutionary evolutionary continuity continuity . . of of mental mental experience"4 experience"4 and and would would claim claim that that many many animals animals have have sufficiently sufficiently extensive extensive temporal temporal awareness, awareness, self self consciousness, consciousness, and and other other requisite requisite aspects aspects of of rationality rationality to to value value life life itself. itself. However, However, I I wi wi II II leave leave the the com com parison parison of of animal animal with with human human psychol psychol ogy, ogy, rationality, rationality, and and values values to to those those who who have have carefully carefully studied studied the the matter, matter, e.g., e.g., the the ethologists. ethologists.
The The truth truth or or falsity falsity of of P3 P3 is is at at least least as as much much a a fac fac tual tual as as a a conceptual conceptual issue issue and and is, is, therefore, therefore, not not resolvable resolvable by by philoso philoso phers. phers.
Cigman Cigman emphasizes emphasizes the the com com plexity plexity of of experience experience in in which which the the human human awareness awareness and and evaluation evaluation of of death death occurs, occurs, and and it it seems seems reasonable reasonable . . to to agree agree with with her her presumption presumption that that many many of of the the animals animals animal animal rightists rightists seek seek to to protect, protect, e. e. g., g., rabbits rabbits and and chickens, chickens, lack lack that that complexity complexity of of experience. experience. So, So, let let us us pass pass by by objec objec tions tions to to P3. P3.
The The line line of of questioning questioning I I wish wish to to pursue pursue here here concerns concerns Pl: Pl: must must one one value value life life itself itself in in order order to to suffer suffer death death as as a a misfortune? misfortune? I I question question Pl Pl because because in in so so many many other other cases cases it it is is not not the the case case that that one one has has to to value value X X itself itself in in order order to to have have a a right right to to X. X. Consequently, Consequently, agreeing agreeing that that if if one one has has a a right right to to X X then then not-X not-X must must be be a a misfortune. misfortune. for for him, him, it it follows follows that that not-X not-X can can be be a a misfortune misfortune for for an an individual individual even even though though he he does does not not value value X X itself. itself. S S Cigman's Cigman's argument argument is is a a specific specific case case of of the the following following argument argument form: form:
Pl': Pl': Only Only beings beings capable capable of of valu valu ing ing X X itself itself can can suffel' suffel' the the misfot,tune misfot,tune of of not-X. not-X.
P2': P2': Only Only beings beings capable capable of of suf suf fering fering not-X not-X as as a a misfortune misfortune can can have have a a right right to to X. X.
P3': P3': B B is is incapable incapable of of valuing valuing X X itself. itself.
C': C': Therefore, Therefore, B B cannot cannot have have a a right right to to X. X. Reflection Reflection on on our our current current practice practice of of according according rights rights will will show show that that there there is is something something wrong wrong with with arguments arguments of of this this form. form.
Further Further reflection reflection will will show show how how Pl' Pl' (and (and P3') P3') can can be be revised revised to to yield yield an an acceptable acceptable argu argu ment ment form. form. However, However, that that form form will will not not exclude exclude the the possibility possibility of of animal animal rights. rights.
Before Before proceeding proceeding with with this this analy analy sis, sis, we we must must clarify clarify what what "valuing "valuing X X itself" itself" refers refers to. to. It It would would be be obvious obvious that that we we can can have have a a right right to to X X even even though though we we do do not not value value X X itself, itself, if if "valuing "valuing X X itself" itself" meant meant "X "X has has intrinsic intrinsic value value for for us us rather rather than than (or (or in in addition addition to) to) instrumental instrumental value." value." Whatever Whatever "intrinsic "intrinsic value" value" may may mean, mean, it it is is clear clear that that we we have have rights rights to to things things which which are are of of merely merely instrumen instrumen tal tal val val ue ue for for us, us, e. e. g., g., a a speedy speedy trial. trial. Cigman's Cigman's insistence insistence that that misfortunes misfortunes be be tied tied to to desires desires (57), (57), her her use use of of the the ph ph rase rase "I "I ife ife itself itself as as an an object object of of value" value" (59), (59), her her rejection rejection of of a a utilita utilita rian rian alternative alternative because because "it "it does does not not justify justify calling calling death death a a misfortune misfortune for for the the animal animal who who dies" dies" (54), (54), and and her her rejection rejection of of Thomas Thomas Nagel's Nagel's analysis analysis of of the the misfortune misfortune of of death death because because it it does does not not require require that that "life "life is is some some thing thing most most of of us us value value and and want want to to experience experience for for as as long long as as possible" possible" (56) (56) give give the the impression impression that that some some sort sort of of shadowy shadowy intrinsic intrinsic value value in in life life vs. vs. merely merely instrumental instrumental value value for for life life distinction distinction is is at at work work in in her her argu argu ment. ment. Be Be that that as as it it may, may, this this distinc distinc tion tion is is incidental incidental to to the the argument argument and and should should not not mislead mislead on on into into dismissing dismissing the the argument argument out out of of hand. hand. The The dis dis tinction tinction on on which which this this argument argument turns turns is is that that between between having having an an interest interest in in X X and and taking taking an an interest interest in in X, X, and and "valuing "valuing life life itself" itself" should should be be inter inter preted preted as as "taking "taking an an interest interest in in life." life."
One One can can "have "have an an interest" interest" in in something something which which affects affects one's one's well-be well-be ing ing but but of of which which one one is is ignorant ignorant or or unconcerned. unconcerned.
Vitamins, Vitamins, pesticides, pesticides, and and heavy heavy metals metals in in drinking drinking water water will will all all affect affect one's one's well-being well-being even even though though one one has has never never heard heard of of them them or or even even though though one one is is unconcerned unconcerned about about them them because because one one does does not not believe believe they they will will affect affect one's one's well-be well-be ing ing . . However, However, "taking "taking an an interest" interest" requires requires that that one one be be aware aware of of the the item item in in question, question, believe believe that that it it affects affects one's one's well-being, well-being, and, and, consequently, consequently, consciously consciously give give a a value value (positive (positive or or negative) negative) to to the the item. item.
Cigman Cigman does does not not employ employ the the language language of of interests, interests, but but the the following following passages passages make make clear clear that that she she is is relying relying on on this this distinction: distinction:
Death Death is is not not a a misfortune misfortune merely merely because because it it is is a a bad bad condition condition to to be be in, in, relative relative to to being being alive, alive, healthy, healthy, and and so so on; on; rather rather it it is is a a misfortu misfortu ne ne because because life life is is something something most most of of us us value value and and wanwan~ to to exe_~ exe_~ rience rience for for as as long long as as possible. possible. (56, (56, emphasis emphasis added) added) I I reject reject the the suggestion suggestion that that a a categorical categorical desire, desire, or or any any thing thing of of this this nature, nature, is is attri attri butable butable to to animals. animals.
For For con con sider sider what what would would have have to to be be the the case case if if this this were were so. so. First, First, animals animals would would have have to to possess possess essentially essentially the the same same conceptions conceptions of of life life and and death death as as persons persons do. do. The The subject subject of of a a categorical categorical desire desire must must either either understand understand death death as as a a condi condi tion tion which which closes closes a a possible possible future future forever, forever, and and leaves leaves behind behind one one a a world world in in which which one one has has no no part part as as an an agent agent or or conscious conscious being being of of any any sort, sort, or or he he must must grasp, grasp, and and then then reject, reject, this this conception conception of of death, death, in in favor favor of of a a bel bel ief ief in in immortality. immortality.
Either Either w~the w~the radical radical and and exclusive exclusive nature nature of of the the transition transition from from life life to to death death must must be be understood--it understood--it must must at at least least be be appreciated appreciated why why people people think think in in these these terms--so terms--so that that the the full full signifi signifi cance cance of of the the idea idea that that "X "X is is a a reason reason for for -Iivin.s" -Iivin.s" may may be be grasped. grasped.
(58-59, (58-59, emphasis emphasis added) added) It It seems seems accurate accurate to to paraphrase paraphrase Cigman Cigman as as claiming claiming that that although although ani ani mals mals may may have have an an interest interest in in life life (since (since it it is is a a good good condition condition to to be be in in relative relative to to death), death), they they cannot cannot take take an an interest interest in in life life (since (since they they are are incapable incapable of of understanding understanding the the full full sign sign ificance ificance of of death). death).
This This distinction distinction between between things things which which affect affect our our interests interests but but in in which which we we do do not not take take an an interest interest is is certainly certainly a a real real one. one. But But is is it it rele rele vant vant to to the the issue issue of of what what it it makes makes sense sense to to sayan sayan individual individual has has a a right right to? to? Is Is it it possible possible to to have have a a right right to to something something which which affects affects one's one's interests interests but but of of which which one one is is ignorant? ignorant? Cer Cer tainly. tainly. People People have have rights rights to to inheri inheri tances tances they they do do not not know know about. about. Even Even patients patients who who are are unaware unaware of of "The "The Patient's Patient's Bill Bill of of Rights" Rights" have have a a right right to to see see thei thei r r medical medical records. records.
And And people people who who have have never never heard heard of of "The "The Universal Universal Declaration Declaration of of the the Rights Rights of of Man" Man" and and have have grown grown up up in in cultu cultu res res which which not not only only deny deny them them human human rights rights but but also also have have taught taught them them to to believe believe they they are are subhuman subhuman are are still still entitled entitled to to human human rights. rights. There There is is no no conceptual, conceptual, moral, moral, or or legal legal difficulty difficulty with with ascribing ascribing a a right right to to X X to to someone someone who who is is unaware unaware either either of of X X or or of of the the possibility possibility that that he he could could have have X X or or the the right right to to X. X. Having Having a a right right to to X X does does not not require require that that we we actually actually know know about, about, desi desi re, re, or or value value X X itself. itself.
It It might might be be objected objected that that it it is is not not actually actually valuing valuing X X itself itself that that is is required required for for the the right right to to X X but but the the capacity capacity to to value value X X itself itself which which is is required. required.
Most Most fundamental fundamental moral moral principles principles involve involve the the idea idea of of capac capac ity, ity, e. e. g., g., the the capacity capacity to to suffer suffer in in utilitarianism utilitarianism and and the the capacity capacity to to rea rea son son in in Kantianism. Kantianism. Cigman Cigman also also emphasizes emphasizes the the ~~E.~~J!Ỹ~E.~~J!Y to to suffer suffer a a misfortune. misfortune.
So, So, perhaps perhaps the the proper proper question question is: is: is is it it possible possible to to have have a a right right to to something something which which affects affects one's one's interests interests but but which which one one is is incC!.pable incC!.pable of of understanding understanding or or valuing? valuing?
Again, Again, there there are are some some fairly fairly obvious obvious cases cases of of this. this.
Severely Severely retarded, retarded, brain-dam brain-dam aged, aged, and and senile senile people people have have legal legal rights, rights, property property rights, rights, civil civil rights, rights, and and human human rights rights which which they they are are incapable incapable of of understanding understanding and and valu valu ing. ing. They They may may value value the the medical medical care care and and other other benefits benefits property, property, social social welfare welfare programs, programs, legal legal procedures, procedures, and and other other things things to to which which they they have have a a right right secure secure for for them, them, but but they they are are incapable incapable of of understanding understanding or or valuing valuing pr'operty, pr'operty, social social welfare welfare institutions, institutions, legal legal procedures, procedures, human human respect, respect, and and moral moral obligation obligation themselves. themselves.
Conse Conse quently, quently, current current moral moral and and legal legal prac prac tice tice show show that that an an individual individual can can have have a a right right to to X X even even though though he he is is inca inca pable pable of of understanding understanding and and valuing valuing X. X. This This conclusion conclusion might might be be criticized criticized for for ignoring ignoring the the normality normality dimension dimension of of the the idea idea of of "capacity". "capacity".
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Similarly, Similarly, Stanley Stanley Benn Benn contends contends that that animal animal rights rights arguments arguments referring referring to to inconsistency inconsistency in in extending extending righh righh to to subrational subrational humans humans while while denying denying them them to to more more rational rational animals animals are are fallacious fallacious because because rights rights are are extended extended primarily primarily not not to to individuals individuals but but to to species species based based on on the the capabilities capabilities of of normal normal members members of of the the species. species. 6 6 So, So, the the proper proper ques ques tion tion may may be: be: is is it it possible possible to to have have a a right right to to something something which which affects affects one's one's interests interests but but which which even even normal normal beings beings of of one's one's kind kind are are incapable incapable of of understanding understanding or or valuing? valuing? Of Of course, course, it it is is impossible impossible for for us us to to refer refer to to any any actual actual cases cases concerning concerning human human beings beings where where this this happens. happens.
Such Such examples examples would would require require that that we we understand understand things things human human beings beings are are incapable incapable of of understanding. understanding.
However, However, the the follow follow ing ing non-human non-human example example seems seems plausi plausi ble ble enough enough to to show show at at least least that that a a positive positive answer answer to to this this question question is is not not nonsensical. nonsensical.
Cigman Cigman acknowledges, acknowledges, as as do do most most opponents opponents of of an an animal animal right right to to life, life, that that an an ima ima Is Is s s hou hou Id Id be be spa spa red red un un nec nec essary essary suffering. suffering. Now, Now, industrial industrial pol pol lution lution causes causes many many animals animals avoidable avoidable suffering, suffering, but but animals animals are are incapable incapable of of understanding understanding how how industrial industrial pollu pollu tants tants affect affect their their habitats, habitats, undermine undermine thei thei r r health, health, and and cause cause them them to to suf suf fer. fer.
It It follows follows that that although although animals animals suffer suffer from from a a polluted polluted environment, environment, they they are are incapable incapable of of valuing valuing a a pollu pollu tant-free tant-free environment. environment.
But But does does it it also also follow, follow, as as Cigman Cigman would would have have to to claim, claim, that that it it would would be be nonsensical nonsensical to to say say that that animals animals whose whose well-being well-being is is destroyed destroyed by by industrial industrial pollution pollution are are suffering suffering a a misfortune misfortune in in losing losing their their healthy healthy habitats habitats and and have have a a right right (call (call it it the the "right "right to to a a healthful healthful envi envi ron ron ment ment tl tl ) )
to to be be protected protected against against indus indus trial trial pollution? pollution? We We encounter encounter no no con con ceptual ceptual difficulty difficulty in in asserting asserting that that people people have have a a right right to to a a healthful healthful environment. environment.
Is Is the the fact fact that that people people normally normally can can but but animals animals normally normally cannot cannot understand understand how how industrial industrial pol pol lutants lutants cause cause them them to to suffer suffer morally morally significant significant enough enough to to show show that that ani ani mals mals cannot cannot conceivably conceivably share share in in this this right? right?
Since Since many many of of the the forms forms of of suffering suffering caused caused by by industrial industrial pollu pollu tants, tants, e. e. g., g., blindness, blindness, debilitation, debilitation, cancer, cancer, and and birth birth defects, defects, are are shared shared by by human human and and non-human non-human animals, animals, reference reference to to the the normal normal capacity capacity for for understanding understanding which which differentiates differentiates human human from from non-human non-human animals animals would would seem seem not not only only to to be be insufficiently insufficiently weighty weighty to to justify justify such such a a claim claim but but also also to to be be so so totally totally beside beside the the point point as as to to be be a a blatant blatant rationalization rationalization of of anth anth ropocentric ropocentric prej prej udice. udice.
It It might might be be objected objected that that (a) (a) since since animals animals take take an an interest interest in in suffering, suffering, suffering suffering can can be be misfor misfor tune tune for for them; them; (b) (b) consequently, consequently, animals animals can, can, at at least least as as far far as as Cigman's Cigman's argument argument is is concerned, concerned, have have a a right right not not to to suffer; suffer; (c) (c) the the right right to to a a healthful healthful envi envi ronment ronment is is just just a a part part of of this this right right not not to to suffer, suffer, since since a a healthful healthful envi envi ronment ronment is is essential essential to to avoid avoid suffer suffer ing; ing; (d) (d) therefore, therefore, the the example example of of the the right right to to a a healthful healthful envi envi ronment ronment does does not not show show that that animals animals can can have have rights rights to to things things they they are are incapable incapable of of valu valu ing. ing.
An An obvious obvious problem problem with with such such an an objection objection is is that that a a healthful healthful environ environ ment ment is is not not really really "a "a part part of" of" not not suf suf fering. fering.
However, However, setting setting aside aside such such technical technical problems, problems, we we may may note note that that using using (a) (a) and and (b) (b) in in conjunction conjunction with with the the following following modification modification of of (c) (c) yields yields the the conclusion conclusion that that animals animals can can have have a a right right to to life: life:
(c') (c') the the right right to to life life is is a a part part of of the the right right not not to to suffer, suffer, since since life life is is essential essential to to avoid avoid suffering. suffering. One One can can avoid avoid suffering suffering by by dying, dying, of of course, course, but but what what is is ordinarily ordinarily valued valued under under the the label label of of "avoiding "avoiding suffer suffer ing" ing" is is not not merely merely the the absence absence of of suf suf fering fering but but a a life life free free of of suffering. suffering. It It is is such such a a life life that that requi requi res res a a healthful healthful environment, environment, so so any any sort sort of of "negative "negative utilitarianism" utilitarianism" rebuttal rebuttal here here is is already already ruled ruled out out by by (c). (c). Consequently, Consequently, the the pattern pattern of of analysis analysis in in (a) (a) through through (d)
These These three three possibilities, possibilities, igno igno rance, rance, individual individual inability inability to to under under stand, stand, and and normal normal inability inability to to under under stand, stand, seem seem to to cover cover the the field. field. So, So, I I conclude conclude that that taking taking an an interest interest in in or or valuing valuing X X itself itself is is not not a a necessary necessary condition condition for for having having a a right right to to X. X. Since Since all all the the cases cases just just discussed discussed sat sat isfy isfy P3 P3 ' ' , , the the problem problem with with the the above above argument argument form form must must lie lie in in Pl' Pl' or or P2'. P2'. But But Cigman's Cigman's claim claim that that rights rights entail entail corresponding corresponding misfortunes misfortunes (P2') (P2') was was conceded, conceded, so so the the failure failure of of this this argu argu ment ment form form must must lie lie in in Pl Pl t, t, the the claim claim that that suffering suffering the the misfortune misfortune of of not-X not-X requires requires taking taking an an interest interest in in X. X. In In all all the the above above examples, examples, the the individuals individuals who who did did not not or or could could not not take take an an interest interest in in X X nonetheless nonetheless had had an an interest interest in in X. X. This This suggests suggests that that we we can can correct correct the the above above argument argument form form by by substituting substituting the the following following for for Pl Pl I I (and (and P3'): P3'):
Pl" Pl" Only Only beings beings which which have have an an interest interest in in X X can can suffer suffer the the misfor misfor tune tune of of not-X. not-X.
P3" P3" B B has has no no interest interest in in X. X.
Pl" Pl" not not on on Iy Iy accommodates accommodates the the above above counterexamples counterexamples to to Pl'; Pl'; it it also also excludes excludes stones, stones, works works of of art, art, machines, machines, and and other other inanimate inanimate objects objects which which are are incapable incapable of of having having rights rights if if anything anything is. is.
Such Such things things cannot cannot have have interests, interests, since since they they have have no no well-being well-being of of their their own, own, any any evalua evalua tion tion of of their their condition condition being being derived derived from from other other beings beings which which have have or or take take an an interest interest in in them. them.
The The case case of of plants plants and and insentient insentient animals animals is is a a bit bit more more problematic. problematic.
Since Since they they can can flou flou rish rish or or wither, wither, it it makes makes sense sense to to say say they they have have a a well-being well-being of of their their own, own, an an excellence excellence or or virtue virtue of of their their own own nature, nature, as as Aristotle Aristotle would would say. say. On On the the other other hand, hand, they they cannot cannot be be covered covered by by standard standard moral moral principles, principles, such such as as the the principle principle of of utility, utility, which which are are concerned concerned with with happiness happiness and and not not merely merely with with flou flou rishing. rishing. ·1 ·1 suggest suggest handling handling this this problem problem in in the the following following way: way: since since moral moral principles principles are are fun fun damentally damentally concerned concerned with with happiness happiness or or rationality, rationality, not not with with growth growth or or even even health, health, we we should should interpret interpret "B "B has has an an interest interest in in X" X" tg tg the the !!1_C?I!!1_C?I~ relevant relevant sense sense to to mean mean 'X 'X has has (or (or will will have have or or is is likely likely to to have) have) an an effect effect on on B's B's feelings feelings of of well-being well-being (e.g., (e.g., pleasure, pleasure, feeling feeling fit, fit, enthusiasm, enthusiasm, con con tentment) tentment) or or his his judgments judgments about about his his well-being. well-being. " " It It follows follows that that plants plants and and insentient insentient animals animals do do not not have have interests interests in in the the morally morally relevant relevant sense sense and and that that all all beings beings have have morally morally rele rele ·vant ·vant interests interests only only where where their their feel feel ings ings or or judgments judgments of of well-being well-being are are involved. involved. It It fu fu rther rther follows, follows, accord accord ing ing to to the the revised revised argument argument form, form, that that no no being being can can have have rights rights in in areas areas where where its· its· feelings feelings or or judgments judgments of of well-being well-being are are not not affected. affected. That That seems seems to to be be placing placing the the distinction distinction where where it it belongs. belongs.
Returning Returning to to the the specific specific case case of of the the misfortune misfortune of of death death and and the the right right to to life, life, the the only only way way to to save save Cigman's Cigman's argument argument would would seem seem to to be be somehow somehow to to show show that that death death and and the the right right to· to· life life is is a a special special case: case: although although in in all all the the sorts sorts of of cases cases just just discussed discussed being being a a possible possible subject subject of of misfortune misfortune and and rights rights does does not not requi requi re re the the ability ability to to take take an an interest, interest, in in the the case case of of the the 111/1� E&A E&A 111/1 misfortune misfortune of of death death and and the the right right to to life life one one must must be be able able to to value value life life itself itself because because . . . . . . . . . . . . I I do do not not know know how how to to fill fill in in that that blank, blank, which which leaves leaves me me with with the the following following speculation speculation and and conclusion. conclusion.
Speculation: Speculation:
We We commonly commonly call call death death a a .misfortune, .misfortune, so so when when Cigman Cigman claims claims that that the the right right to to life life presup presup poses poses the the possibility possibility of of suffering suffering the the misfortune misfortune of of death, death, that that seems seems rea rea sonable sonable enough. enough.
However, However, as as she she progresses progresses through through her her argument, argument, she she ties ties "misfortune" "misfortune" to to valuing, valuing, in in the the sense sense of of taking taking an an interest, interest, thereby thereby giving giving "misfortune" "misfortune" a a technical technical mean mean ing ing which which does does not not quite quite fit fit with with its its common common use. use.
It It would would not not be be more more unusual unusual to to describe describe a a pelican pelican born born blind blind as as "unfortunate" "unfortunate" or or having having "suf "suf fered fered a a misfortune" misfortune" or or even even "tragic" "tragic" (since (since it it will will certainly certainly die die from from this this affliction) affliction) than than it it would would be be to to so so describe describe a a human human infant infant born born blind. blind. This This unnoticed unnoticed equivocation equivocation on on "mis "mis fortune" fortune" (technical (technical use use in in Pl Pl but but common common use use in in P2) P2) is is what what makes makes the the argument argument seem seem plausible. plausible. Conclusion: Conclusion: Pl Pl is is false. false. One One can can suffer suffer the the misfortune misfortune of of death death even even though though one one lacks lacks the the inteilectual inteilectual capacity capacity for for taking taking an an interest interest in in or or valuing valuing life life itself. itself. Assuming Assuming no no after after life life awaits awaits one--the one--the traditional traditional assump assump tion tion in in the the case case of of animals--that animals--that is is not not hard hard to to understand: understand: death death is is ordinar ordinar ily ily a a misfortune misfortune for for an an individual individual (whether (whether he he knows knows it it or or not) not) because because it it totally totally eliminates eliminates the the possibility possibility of of his his further further happiness. happiness. For For a a highly highly rational, rational, self-conscious self-conscious being being the the mis mis fortune fortune of of death death may may have have additional additional sources, sources, e.g., e.g., the the frustration frustration of of cat cat egorical egorical desires, desires, but but this this annihilation annihilation of of the the possibility possibility of of happiness happiness is is suf suf ficient ficient to to render render death death a a serious serious enough, enough, morally morally significant significant loss loss to to be be a a misfortune. misfortune. That That death death is is commonly commonly not not considered considered a a misfortune misfortune but but a a blessing blessing when when this this possibility possibility has has already already been been eliminated eliminated by by disease disease or or 7 7 accident accident adds adds credence credence to to this this inter inter pretation. pretation. Consequently, Consequently, even even if if ani ani mals mals cannot cannot attend attend to, to, understand understand the the importance importance of, of, and and value value life life itself, itself, it it does does not not follow follow that that they they cannot cannot suf suf fer fer the the misfortune misfortune of of death death nor nor that that it it would would be be nonsensical nonsensical to to extend extend the the right right to to life life to to them them to to protect protect them them from from this this misfortune. misfortune.
One One last last criticism criticism might might be be made made at at this this point: point: it it might might be be objected objected that that for for an an individual individual to to suffer suffer the the misfor misfor tune tune of of death, death, death death must must be be a a mis mis fortune fortune for for him him and and this this is is not not accountedfor accountedfor by by the the above above analysis. analysis. Cigman Cigman writes: writes:
If If the the worst worst that that can can be be said said of of the the quick quick and and painless painless death death of of an an animal animal is is that that it it removes removes a a quantity quantity of of pleasu pleasu rable rable experience experience from from the the world, world, this this does does not not justify justify call call that that death death a a misfortune misfortune for for the the animal animal who who dies. dies. (54) (54) Phrases Phrases of of the the foriTl"not-X foriTl"not-X is is a a mis mis fortune fortune for for B" B" are are ambiguous. ambiguous. They They may may be be equivalent equivalent to to "not-X "not-X is is B's B's misfortune" misfortune" or or to to "B "B considers considers not-X not-X a a misfortune." misfortune." Even Even this this latter latter option option is is ambiguous, ambiguous, since since it it may may be be equiva equiva lent lent to to "B "B judges judges not-X not-X to to be be a a mis mis fortune" fortune" or or to to "B "B directly directly experiences experiences not-X not-X to to be be a a misfortune." misfortune."
Surveying Surveying these these alternatives, alternatives, we we can can see see that that the the last last is is too too strong strong for for an an acceptable acceptable analysis analysis of of the the misfor misfor tune tune of of death. death. There There are are some some forms forms of of death death which which we we cannot cannot directly directly experience experience but but which which we we want want to to be be protected protected against against by by the the right right to to life life and, and, therefore, therefore, want want to to have have counted counted as as misfortunes. misfortunes. For For example, example, we we can can not not directly directly experience experience a a sudden sudden death death while while in in a a deep deep sleep sleep to to be be a a misfortune. misfortune. On On the the other other hand, hand, the the second second alternative alternative is is too too weak, weak, since since we we can can judge judge to to be be misfortunes misfortunes things things which which do do not not affect affect ou ou r r lives. lives.
For For example, example, I I would would judge judge that that the the mem mem bers bers of of The The People's People's Temple Temple who who suf suf.. .. fered fered a a mass mass death death in in Guyana Guyana three three years years ago ago suffered suffered a a misfortune, misfortune, but but it it certainly certainly does does not not follow follow that that I I have have suffered suffered the the misfortune misfortune of of death. death. This This leaves leaves only. only. the the "not-X "not-X is is B's B's misfortune" misfortune" alternative alternative as as a a suitable suitable interpretation interpretation of of "death "death is is a a misfor misfor tune tune for for B," B," and and the the above above analysis analysis of of the the misfortune misfortune of of death death accounts accounts for for that that alternative. alternative. Death Death is is a a mis mis fortune fortune for for an an animal animal because because it it is is its its possibility possibility of of future future happiness, happiness, and and not not merely merely some some anonymous anonymous "quantity "quantity of of pleasu pleasu rable rable experience," experience," which which is is destroyed destroyed by by its its death. death. So, So, the the claim claim that that to to suffer suffer the the misfortune misfortune of of death death death death must must be be a a misfortune misfortune for for the the one one who who dies dies does does not not constitute constitute an an objection objection to to an an animal's animal's death death being being a a misfortune. misfortune. Common Common usage usage confirms confirms this this conclu conclu sion. sion.
Recent Recent a a young young woman woman was was wal wal king king along along a a San San Francisco Francisco street street on on a a stormy stormy night. night.
As As she she walked walked past past an an old old building, building, a a large large piece piece of of the the building's building's concrete concrete parapet parapet fell fell from from the the sixth sixth floor floor and and struck struck her her on on the the head. head. She She never never knew knew what what hit hit her; her; she she died died instantly. instantly.
No No one one would would feel feel any any hesitation hesitation in in saying saying this this was was a a misfortune misfortune for for the the young young woman woman (not (not just just for for her her family family and and friends), friends), even even though though she she experienced experienced no no fear fear of of impending impending death death nor nor any any sense sense of of frustration frustration of of her her plans plans for for the the future. future.
The The misfortune misfortune is is that that here here was was a a young young woman woman "cut "cut off off in in the the prime prime of of life," life," a a young young woman woman "with "with her her whole whole life life ahead ahead of of her," her," a a young young woman woman who who will will never never have have the the chance chance to to experience experience "the "the joys joys life life might might have have brought brought her." her."
These These common common expressions expressions do do not not refer refer to to the the young young woman's woman's philosophy philosophy of of life, life, feelings feelings at at dying, dying, or or prospects prospects for for the the future. future. They They refer refer to to the the happy happy life life she she might might have have had had but but now now never never will, will, and and that that is is very very sad. sad. The The same same can can be be said said for for a a caracul caracul lamb lamb killed killed less less than than a a day day out out of of its its mother's mother's womb womb or or a a baby baby seal seal killed killed when when only only a a few few days days old old or or a a veal veal calf calf slaugh slaugh tered tered when when only only a a few few months months old. old.
Their Their early early deaths deaths are are misfortunes misfortunes for for them, them, for for they, they, too, too, are are cut cut off off in in the the prime prime of of life, life, had had their their whole whole lives lives ahead ahead of of them, them, and and will will never never know know the the joys joys life life might might have have brought brought them. them.
These These cases, cases, too, too, are are very very sad, sad, and and if if we we can can set set aside aside our our sen sen timental timental bias bias in in favor favor of of ou ou r r oWn oWn spec spec ies, ies, we we can can see see that that we we have have the the same same reasons reasons for for saying saying that that a a misfortune misfortune has has befallen befallen these these animals animals as as we we do do for for saying saying that that a a misfortune misfortune has has befal befal len len the the young young woman woman killed killed by by the the falling falling parapet. parapet.
In In closing closing I I would would like like briefly briefly to to discuss discuss one one other, other, unfortunate unfortunate classic classic to to be be found found in in Cigman's Cigman's paper. paper. She She asserts asserts that that advocates advocates of of animal animal rights rights who who draw draw an an analogy analogy between between specie specie sism sism and and racism racism and and sexism sexism are are claim claim ing ing that that as as women women and and blacks blacks should should have have equal· equal· rights rights to to those those of of men men and and whites, whites, animals animals should should have have rights rights equal equal to to those those of of persons, persons, because because difference difference of of species species does does not not constitute constitute a a morally morally relevant relevant difference. difference. (47) (47) Apparently, Apparently, many many people people have have been been offended offended by by the the suggestion suggestion that that there there is is an an analogy analogy between between species species ism ism and and racism racism and and sexism. sexism. 1 1 D D They They seem seem to to feel feel that that it it is is absu absu rd rd to to suggest suggest that that animal animal welfare welfare issues issues have have the the same same moral moral importance importance as as human human justice justice issues issues and and that that the the analogy analogy demeans demeans efforts efforts to to secure secure human human justice. justice. Per Per haps haps it it is is these these feelings feelings which which lead lead opponents opponents of of animal animal rights. rights. so so often often to to misrepresent misrepresent the the animal animal rights rights move move ment ment as as a a call call for for equal equal rights. rights.
The The prejudice prejudice of of speciesism speciesism does does not not lie lie in in denying denying animals animals the the same same set set of of rights rights enjoyed enjoyed by by humans. humans. Animals Animals have have no no interest interest in in equal equal edu edu cational cational or or vocational vocational opportunities, opportunities, so so it it would would be be nonsensical nonsensical to to suggest suggest that that they they should should share share human human rights rights to to them. them.
Similarly, Similarly, the the prejudice prejudice of of speciesism speciesism does does not not lie lie in in believing believing that that human human life, life, with with its its greater greater range range of of capabilities capabilities for for making making the the world world a a morally morally better' better' place, place, has has a a greater greater moral moral worth worth than than animal animal life. life. Peter Peter Singer, Singer, for for example, example, explicitly explicitly acknowledges acknowledges that that if if one one is is forced forced to to choose choose between between preserving preserving a a human human life life or or an an animal's animal's life, life, it it would would (in (in most most cases) cases) not not be be speciesist speciesist to to prefer prefer the the human human life. life. 11 11 The The prejudice prejudice of of speciesism speciesism lies lies in in denying denying the the interĩnter~ ests ests of of animals animals equal equal consideration consideration with with the the Ii Ii ke ke interests interests of of humans. humans.
Just Just as as it it would would be be immoral immoral to to fol fol low low Swift's Swift's modest modest proposal proposal 12 12 routinely routinely (and (and avoidably) avoidably) to to sacrifice sacrifice some some peo peo ple's ple's interest interest in in life life to to fulfill fulfill others' others' interest interest in in food, food, so so it it should should be be immoral immoral routinely routinely (and (and avoidably) avoidably) to to sacrifice sacrifice animals' animals' interest interest in in life life for for that that pu pu rpose. rpose.
Species Species differences differences do do not not morally morally justify justify such such routine, routine, avoi avoi dable dable sacrifice sacrifice of of animal animal interests interests in in favor favor of of human human interests. interests. This This is is the the sort sort of of proposal proposal animal animal rightists rightists are are making. making. The The analogy, analogy, then, then, between between speciesism speciesism and and racism racism and and sexism sexism is is that that humans humans regard regard animals animals as as beings beings whose whose interests interests may may be be routinely routinely sac sac rificed rificed for for the the fulfillment fulfillment of of their their (human) (human) desires, desires, much much as as whites whites and and men men have have regarded regarded blacks blacks and and women women as as beings beings whose whose interests interests do do not not merit merit equal equal consideration consideration with with their their own. own.
The The animal animal rights rights movement movement prespres~ ents ents at at least least as as serious serious a a challenge challenge to to contemporary contemporary morality morality and and lifestyle lifestyle as as do do the the civil civil rights rights and and women's women's move move ments, ments, if if seriousness seriousness be be measured measured by by the the number number of of individuals individuals involved, involved, the the fact fact that that life life or or death death is is often often at at issue, issue, or or the the changes changes in in morality morality and and lifestyle lifestyle that that the the success success of of the the move move ment ment would would occasion. occasion. This This movement movement neither neither insults insults the the moral moral significance significance of of the the civil civil rights rights and and women's women's rights rights movements movements nor nor makes makes absu absu rd rd claims claims that that can can be be demonstrated demonstrated to to be be non non sensical. sensical. William William James James said said that that reac reac tion tion to to philosophical philosophical movements movements passes passes through through several several phases, phases, the the first first of of which which is is to to portray portray the the movement movement as as But But such such qualifications, qualifications, e.g., e.g., "one "one can can have have rights rights only only in in those those areas areas which which affect affect one's one's feel feel ings ings or or judgments judgments about about one's one's well-being well-being or or the the well-being well-being of of those those as as whose whose agent agent one one is is act act ing," ing," would would not not undermine undermine the the present present argument. argument. Nor Nor would would add add ing ing the the usual usual caveats caveats concerning concerning capacity capacity and and normalcy. normalcy. 8.� Suffering Suffering loss loss is is not not essentially essentially 8.
a a tied tied to to suffering suffering unpleasant unpleasant feel feel ings ings at at the the loss. loss.
"He "He suffered suffered a a great great loss loss without without even even knowing knowing it" it" is is not not a a paradoxical paradoxical statement; statement; it it refers refers to to such such mundane mundane things things as as unknowingly unknowingly putting putting a a rare rare penny penny in in a a gumball gumball machine machine and and failing failing to to answer answer a a phone phone call call which which would would have have earned earned one one a a great great prize. prize.
Failing Failing to to recognize recognize this this difference difference between between suffering suffering a a loss loss and and other other kinds kinds of of suffering suffering may may have have misled misled some some philosophers philosophers into into believing believing that that only only those those capable capable of of experiencing experiencing some some feel feel ing ing of of grief, grief, frustration, frustration, etc., etc., at at (the (the prospect prospect of) of) death death are are capa capa ble ble of of suffering suffering the the misfortune misfortune of of death. death.
Also, Also, the the possibility possibility of of suffering suffering a a unpleasant unpleasant should should not not possibility possibility where where what what loss loss without without suffering suffering feelings feelings at at the the loss loss be be confused confused w-fih w-fih the the of of suffering suffering a a loss loss is is lost lost will will not not affect affect one's one's feelings feelings even even in in the the condi condi tional tional sense sense that that if if one one had had had had X X (or (or if if X X had had occu occu rred), rred), then then one's one's life life would would have have been been happier happier (or (or more more satisfying satisfying or or less less unpleasant, unpleasant, etc.). etc.). How How this this latter latter possibility possibility is is to to be be understood understood and and what, what, if if any, any, moral moral significance significance it it may may have have are are controversies controversies we we need need not not enter enter into into here, here, for for I I am am not not attempting attempting to to defend defend the the possibil possibil ity ity of of an an animal animal right right to to life life on on the the basis basis of of that that latter latter possibility. possibility. 9. 9. Epicurus Epicurus contended contended that that an an indi indi vidual's vidual's death death could could not not be be a a mis mis fortune fortune for for him him because because while while he he is is alive alive he he cannot cannot suffer suffer it it and and when when he he is is dead dead he he cannot cannot suffer suffer anything. anything. The The above above analysis analysis indicates indicates that that it it is is the the living living who who suffer suffer the the misfortune misfortune of of death. death. This This is is not not self-contradictory, self-contradictory, because because (although (although some some may may brood brood about about it it beforehand) beforehand) the the living living suffer suffer this this misfortune misfortune only only when when they they die. die.
Harry Harry Silverstein Silverstein has has recently recently contended contended (in (in "The "The Evil Evil of of Death," Death," The The Journal Journal of of Philoso Philoso LXXYII17(1980)) LXXYII17 (1980) ) that that such such a a deprivation deprivation resolution" resolution" of of "Epicu "Epicu rus' rus' dilemma" dilemma" will will not not work, work, because because it it includes includes a a life-death life-death comparison comparison which which presupposes presupposes that that death death has has a a value value for for the the dead dead person, person, which which is is impossible. impossible.
Sil Sil verstein verstein confuses confuses death death as as the the loss loss of of a a possibility possibility (further (further life) life) with with death death as as the the actualization actualization of of an an alternative alternative possibility possibility (a (a world world in in which which the the individual individual is is no no longer longer alive). alive).
It It is is the the former former which which (ordinarily) (ordinarily) involves involves the the misfor misfor tu tu ne ne of of death., death., viz., viz., the the loss loss of of the� possibility possibility offurther offurther happi the happi ness, ness, and and the the subject subject of of the the loss loss of of life life is is the the living living person person who who dies. 
